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The leading digit of a number represents its non-zero leftmost digit. For instance, the 
leading digits of 19 and 0.072 are 1 and 7, respectively. Benford’s law (BL) was 
originally discovered in the late nineteenth century [1,2] as an anecdotal pattern 
emerging in seemingly as disparate datasets as streets addresses, freezing points of 
chemical compounds, house prices or physical constants, with the leading digit d in 
those datasets following a logarithmically decaying distribution P(d)=log10(1+1/d) 
instead of being uniformly distributed as one may naïvely assume. Later this pattern 
was shown to be a consequence of a central limit-type mechanism [3,4,5] emerging 
not only empirically but also in mathematical sequences of several garments. A few 
years ago, some authors devised a way to leverage BL as an ‘anti-fraud’ tool [6,7], 
based on a simple idea: assuming this law is expected to naturally emerge in a 
certain dataset, then if the dataset has been manipulated or data has been 
fabricated, the statistics would deviate from the law in a way which could be 
quantitatively measured. Accordingly, BL and variants have been proposed to 
assess fraud in contexts ranging from election data [8-11] to financial accounting in 
external, internal, and governmental auditing [12]. In PNAS, Cerioli et al [13] take this 
strategy to the next level, and propose a sophisticated statistical modelling 
framework which can be used to monitor and detect hints of individual fraudulent 
behavior in the context of international trade (i.e. imports and exports that are 
declared by national traders and shipping agents). The authors of this work develop 
a mathematical model which provides the correct statistical tests to assess the 
conformance to BLs of individual traders, and validate the whole framework in 
realistic scenarios enabled by high resolution transaction data from the customs of 
various EU member states.  
 
A naïve approach to flag potential misuse or manipulation of data using BL is the 
following: under the premise that a particular dataset conforms to a specific 
theoretical distribution (BL or other variants of the law for e.g. the second leading 
digit), the strategy is to compare the empirical leading digit distribution found in the 
actual data against the expected BL. Applying goodness of fit and a contrast of 
hypothesis one can conclude whether the null hypothesis (‘the empirical one 
conforms to the expected BL’) can be rejected up to a certain confidence level. This 
is typically the approach taken to assess vote count statistics in the context of 
election forensics [8-11]. Note, however, that methodologies based on BL and 
variants are not totally free of healthy controversy [15,16], and it's also true that 
potential fraudsters aware of these regularities can try to make up data in such a way 
that specific patterns which emerge in fair data also hold even in the manipulated 
data. Even more dramatically, despite some common misperception that the origin of 
BL is reasonably well understood, this is actually not the case [17]. In other words, 
there is no general theory fully guaranteeing that BL should systematically emerge in 
a particular un-manipulated dataset. 
 
In [13], Cerioli et al are able to circumvent these issues by pre-assessing the 
conditions under which BL should emerge in the context of international trade, i.e. 
the conditions under which the subsequent inferences can be trusted. These authors 
actually pioneer the application of BL to the context of international trade, but why 
would this be an important area of application? If only, because of the money. Big 
money. Just to give a sense of scale, the European Union (EU) accounts for around 
15% of world’s trade in goods, translating in over 1800 billion euros on imports and a 
similar quantity of exports only in 2017, with a positive balance between the two of 
over 20 billions [19]. Being able to detect fraudulent behavior --including under-
reported goods-- is therefore of paramount importance [14]. Devising a robust and 
accurate statistical method which could be easily embedded online to automatically 
monitor transaction activities and flag suspicious ones would tick all the boxes 
(reliability, flexibility, efficiency, cost-effectiveness). This also aligns with the overall 
modernization strategy currently pursued by the World Customs Organization [18]. 
 
 
Cerioli et al [13] successfully address the two main challenges that might otherwise 
preclude a realistic detection of fraud via BL analysis of individual traders:  
First, they establish solid conditions for the validity of the BL in the field of 
international trade data –this being an essential for step for the implementation of 
large-scale, automatic monitoring processes--. Second, they find approximations and 
corrections to the adequate test statistics needed to scrutinize fraud in those 
instance where BL is not actually expected to hold. Importantly, the authors are 
therefore able to discriminate two cases for non-conformance to BL: those that are 
related to data fabrication and fraud from the so-called ‘false positives’: legitimate 
deviations which emerge for instance for traders who operate on a limited number of 
products (so that there is not enough variability in their transactions for the BL to 
emerge in the first place). As a result, traders can be classified into three groups: 
legitimate traders whose activity conforms to BL, those whose activity is still 
legitimate but does not conform to BL due to controlled factors, and those that do not 
conform to BL even if they should, probably due to data fabrication (see Fig.1 for an 
illustration). 
 
On a technical level, Cerioli et al [13] initially argue that the sequence of transaction 
values for a particular trader complies with Hill’s central limit theorem [3] hypothesis. 
By generating synthetic transactions of ‘idealized traders’, the authors can 
statistically assess the conditions where BL holds, and in what circumstances 
classical chi-squared tests can therefore be applied. An important result is that BL 
breaks down as the theoretical expected distribution when the number of different 
traded goods m is much smaller than the total number of transactions n (m<<n), so 
in those instances a blind chi-squared test is not recommended. 
One of the important novelties of [13] is that they model transaction data via a trader-
specific contamination model composed by linearly interpolating a mixture of two 
distributions for the leading digit: a ‘legitimate’ one (usually BL) which is 
parametrically dependent on n and m, and a contaminant distribution that models the 
effect of data manipulation. The null hypothesis (legit trader) is equivalent to having a  
null coefficient on the contaminant distribution, however this scenario is only 
equivalent to conformance to BL when the transaction data fulfil the criteria 
discussed above. In those cases where the expected distribution for non-fraudsters 
deviates from BL for legitimate reasons, the authors can plug in the actual expected 
distribution as the legitimate one, and can deduce –among other things-- what is the 
correct distribution of the test statistic which shall be used to reject the null 
hypothesis of a legit transaction pattern. 
 
 
Validation and calibration of the theoretical framework was possible thanks to the 
access to real-data of import/exports declared by national traders and shipping 
agents using the form called Single Administrative Document (SAD) (data was 
provided by Italian customs and by the Customs Office of another EU member state 
not disclosed for its specific confidentiality policy). Results overall show that Cerioli et 
al’s methodology [13] can flag fraudsters and ‘de-flag’ traders whose activity deviates 
from expected BLs due to legitimate reasons. The authors discuss a particularly 
illuminating case of a trader extracted from an archive of fraudulent declarations 
provided by the Italian Customs, whose fraudulent behavior was only discovered 
after substantial investigation on two of the declarations concluded they were 
fraudulent. In such case, a standard protocol based on robust regression techniques 
aiming at the automatic detection of value frauds in customs data did not provide 
clear evidence of substantial undervaluation or of other major anomalies. Cerioli et 
al’s analysis on the other hand produced a strong signal of contamination of the digit 
distribution for this trader, and their statistical analysis safely concluded the presence 
of fraudulent manipulation. 
 
 
In conclusion, Cerioli et al’s [13] provides a principled framework for goodness-of-fit 
testing of BL for anti-fraud purposes, with a focus on customs data. This 
methodology has the potential to be embedded –probably in combination with more 
standard and model-free approaches [6,12]-- in real international trade anti-fraud 
protocols and audits in the near future. On this respect, a web application [13] 
developed with the purpose to assist customs officers and auditors in the screening 
task has already been set in place. 
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Fig.1 An individual trader leaves a trace of transaction activities. The method computes the leading digit 
distribution P(d) and (i) evaluates which is the expected law if no manipulation has occurred, and (ii) 
obtains the adequate test statistic distribution. Statistical comparison between the empirical and 
expected distribution concludes whether the data conform or deviate from BL, and in the latter case, 
whether this deviation is due to legitimate reasons or not. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
